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The Soft Law of the Covenant:
Making Governance Instrumental
ABSTRACT ■ Covenants are agreements between the government and social
partners to implement public policy. They are a form of soft law, guiding the
regulation of self-regulation, and are specifically relevant in bridging the
macro and meso levels of society. Covenants prove effective where actors
share goals, and learn to advance policy-making by monitoring efforts, effects
and possible risks, and by subsequently fine-tuning follow-up actions.
Positive-sum outcomes often result. We describe successful examples of this
method of cooperation in the realm of working conditions and employment,
and claim that covenants can be helpful in facilitating collective-bargaining
framework agreements. In terms of EU policies, covenants are an instance of
so-called European Governance Arrangements, the political and institutional
foundations of which are still to be developed.
Introduction
Discussion of EU regulation has given increasing attention to ‘soft law’,
targeted at influencing the behaviour of organizations, systems and even
whole polities, in contrast to ‘hard law’, which is most effective in regu-
lating the behaviour of individuals. Covenants (in Dutch, convenanten)
are a new variant of soft law in the field of industrial relations, covering
public goals, the operationalization and execution of which is delegated
to social partners and organizations (‘self-regulation’). Because the
government initiates or facilitates the process, or both, it can be described
as ‘regulation of self-regulation’.
In this article, we sketch some applications of covenants, mainly on
matters of working conditions and employment. They have proved effec-
tive for issues where goals are shared, but where the path towards achiev-
ing them is uncertain and therefore risky. The method of ‘learning by
monitoring’ is shown to be helpful in tackling the risks involved.
In certain respects, covenants have the same function as collective-
bargaining framework agreements. The difference is that they explicitly
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address public policy and thus include an active ‘governance’ role for
the government. Nevertheless, once covenants result in applicable
procedures, such results may become part and parcel of a collective
agreement. We claim that covenants are a specific and rather unique
form of cooperation, distinct from initiatives such as social dialogue,
social pacts, territorial employment pacts, pacts for employment and
competitiveness (PECs) and the like. The social dialogue is heavily
influenced by the European Commission and has, consequently, mainly
proved effective when the social partners have negotiated and bargained
‘under the shadow of law’; as an autonomous process, it still has to
prove its worth. Social pacts actually embrace two developments: a
resumption of national consultation between governments and social
partners, on the one hand, and the decentralization of collective bargain-
ing, on the other. In the latter context, we note a growing integration of
distributive and integrative issues; in the former, a renewed emphasis on
wage moderation, in conjunction with ever vaguer projects for employ-
ment creation. So far, the net employment effect of these pacts is a
matter for polite speculation, both in terms of the quality and quantity
of jobs. The territorial employment pacts consist in a growing number
of pilot projects, sometimes effective, but deficient in conception, design
and delivery.
To be sure, ‘soft’ elements can be detected in all these forms (Sisson
and Marginson, 2001). Yet the covenant is not readily comparable
because public goods (employment and health and safety at work) are
both produced and implemented according to a procedure in which the
government is integrated, but in which the social partners take the actual
lead in delivering the goods. The specificity of the covenant is that the
route to success is discovered only along the way, by the same parties
who will actually have to implement the results. Those who learn,
monitor at the same time. The social partners can participate at all levels,
depending on the issue, but the sectoral and industry level, together with
the company level, are the most conspicuous. Participation is voluntary
and, of course, depends on the issue at hand.
Since covenants bridge the differences between public authorities and
social partners in the pursuit of publicly relevant tasks, they presuppose
both a credible government (the ‘regulation’ aspect) and a credible level
of self-organization (the ‘self-regulation’ aspect). Both conditions are met
nationally, at least in some countries, but at present not at the level of the
EU.1
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Covenants and European Regulation: Opportunities and
Pitfalls
Two types of EU decision influence national policies. First, some legis-
lation is directly applicable, prescribing what to do and how to do it.
Second, most directives prescribe what to do, but not how to do it: this
is the prerogative of the member states. The doctrine of ‘subsidiarity’ is
relevant for an increasing number of themes and issues, employment and
social inclusion among them, that are defined as ‘common concerns’ of
both the EU and its member states.
Covenants, as defined in the Netherlands, are ‘signed written agree-
ments of the government with one or more other parties in order to effec-
tuate governmental policy’ (Van Ommeren, 1993: 29). They regulate
‘how’ themes and issues of common concern can be tackled, and like
most soft law are procedural rather than substantive. Declarations of
intent, ‘gentlemen’s agreements’ or simply ‘agreements’ are functionally
equivalent to covenants, if they entail the mutual commitment to publicly
relevant common concerns and public involvement as such.
In the past 20 years, the language and practice of convenanten have
gained wide acceptance in the Netherlands. In the building trades, in
environmental policy, in education, in health care, and in the field of
labour, hundreds have been signed. For the government, the advantage is
that covenants may compensate for the defects of traditional legislation,
substituting for the declining power of ‘command and control’. With the
covenant the government enlists the cooperation of non-public parties in
order to achieve its goals. For the latter (for example, companies and
social partners) the advantage is an enhanced predictability of the behav-
iour of public authorities: by binding themselves, they also bind the
government. Paradoxically, though legally unenforceable the covenant
guarantees the non-governmental parties a measure of legal security they
would not otherwise have (De Ru, 1993: 27; Van Ommeren and De Ru,
1993: 297).
Covenants have also become common in Belgian Flanders, while in
Germany the practice called informales Verwaltungshandeln2 has many
similarities (Grijns, 1993). Here, and elsewhere, we find new instruments
of public–private cooperation as part and parcel of national policies.
Legally, these instruments are hybrid. They are not like regular contracts,
nor are they laws: they bind, yet not in a legal sense. Rather than
prescribe, they create mutual commitment. They do not stress hierarchy,
but emphasize reciprocal dependence, treating dependence not as a
weakness to overcome, but as a model for discovering the advantages of
cooperation. They spell governance (horizontal relations between
governments and other parties) instead of government (vertical relations),
but are not a substitute for government. Rather, they complement it.
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They presuppose a credible government, capable of assuming credible
commitments. By the same token, they presuppose accountable and
representative parties. At national level, in the Netherlands with its long
history of consultation and negotiation, but also in Flanders and
Germany, credible governments and accountable and representative
parties can be said to exist. At the level of the EU, on the other hand, they
are lacking, at least in the policy domains of employment and social
inclusion. European governance of employment and social inclusion is
governance by default, rather than by complementarity.
Recognition that the effectiveness of law is limited in the case of
organizations and societal (sub-)systems has led to two reactions. One is
to import economic and political criteria into law (for example, the idea
of an ‘efficient breach of contract’ or ‘optimal regulation’) (Teubner, 1989:
128). The other is to ‘proceduralize’ law: instead of controlling social
systems, legal mechanisms are designed to respond to their inner
workings (Teubner, 1988: 307–13, 1989: 147). The latter reaction is
dubbed ‘reflexive’ law, geared to the accountability, as distinct from the
responsibility, of systems and organizations. If social systems such as law,
politics, the economy and organizations in general are ‘black boxes’ for
one another, intervention will predictably produce unforeseen and
possibly unwanted effects. However, covenants or other forms of regu-
lating self-regulation can connect the relevant parties, so that black boxes
‘become “whitened” in the sense that an interaction relation develops
among them which is transparent for them in its regularities’ (Teubner,
1988: 320). That is, systems can learn from their interaction, if only
because they do not sever the ties between learning and monitoring
(Sabel, 1994). What is distinctive about covenants is not that targets are
set, but that these lead to a process of identifying and tackling bottle-
necks, which once resolved lead to the discovery of new bottlenecks and
so on. Covenants connect targets with procedures, generating learning
trajectories by and for all the parties that have to perform the actual tasks
of implementation. Covenants are most valuable, therefore, when
consensus can be reached on the goals and their translation into targets,
but when the route to their attainment still has to be discovered.
As such, the open method of coordination (OMC) seems another clear
example of reflexive labour law, soft law or the ‘regulation of self-regu-
lation’. The promotion of a ‘social dialogue’ (Supiot, 2000), strengthened
by the promise of ‘bargaining in the shadow of law’ (Teubner, 1985: 336),
points in the same direction. Open policy coordination, as distinct from
policy competition, is the official creed of the EU. Open coordination is
a soft method of influencing the decisions of more or less autonomous
systems, from polities and policy domains and industrial relations down
to the shop floor. On the other hand, one should not forget that the
European level of decision-making in the social domain is strongly
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subordinated to national interests, in terms both of voting procedures
(qualified majority voting) and of the demarcation of its competence
(subsidiarity). The gathering, dissemination and discussion by the
European Commission of information from national sources, consoli-
dated in a common format, is still the major instance of open coordina-
tion in the field of employment.
How has the OMC fared so far? Its field of application becomes ever
broader; here we restrict ourselves to the European Employment
Strategy (EES). Applying the OMC means: (1) establishing guidelines for
the Union; (2) translating these into national and regional policy; (3)
establishing indicators and benchmarks; and (4) periodic monitoring,
evaluation and peer review (De La Porte et al., 2001: 293; Jacobsson, 2004:
357). Three key documents in the EES are the guidelines, drawn up by
the Commission and finalized by the Council, the National Action Plans
(NAPs), in which member states apply the guidelines and report on
specific measures and targets, and the Joint Employment Report by the
Commission, in which progress is compared to guidelines and new
recommendations are announced. According to the Draft Joint Employ-
ment Report for 2004/05, much remains to be improved. Crucial for the
OMC is the adequacy of the NAPs to promote the objectives and imple-
ment the guidelines of the EES. The Commission is hardly enthusiastic
about developments on this score: ‘The NAPs in general do not reflect
the political consensus to focus the EES on implementation and the
delivery of policy . . . Important implementation gaps exist in all Member
States, in particular regarding employment levels, the effective exit age
from the labour market and participation and investment in education
and training. One would therefore expect the exchange on good govern-
ance practices to be given a higher priority’ (EC, 2005: 37).
This judgement by the Commission is not the first one in this vein. In
2002, it identified four key issues for improvement: clear objectives;
simplification of guidelines; governance and partnership; and consistency
and complementarity. Progress has been made in the simplification of the
guidelines, the one issue on which the Commission itself has the main
initiative. On the other issues, progress is still slow, at best. This may not
be the final verdict: we find in the literature on the OMC many asser-
tions of the potentiality of this mode of soft governance, and the opti-
mists might well prove right in the future (one example, representative of
many, is Trubek and Trubek, 2003). On the other hand, if the OMC is to
become a success, several design requirements are in order. Among these
is political muscle at European level, capable of mandating the authority
at stake, and therefore relying on effective European government. For
here as well, governance is no substitute for government. Also required
are representative and accountable societal stakeholders. Time and again,
however, the actual involvement of the social partners in the making of
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NAPs is judged inadequate (Goetschy, 1999; De La Porte and Pochet,
2004: 74). Also, the organizational leverage of the social partners at the
EU level is weak (Dølvik, 1997; Jensen et al., 1997). In order to empower
the OMC, a series of what Schmitter (2001) calls European Governance
Arrangements (EGAs) may prove necessary. The NAPs could figure
among these, provided that these plans shed their governmental slant and
are, indeed, transformed into instruments of multi-party governance. The
covenant may suggest the way to proceed, in a future yet to arrive.
Covenants and Working Conditions
Sickness and disability are key issues in the Netherlands, because the
proportion of the workforce registered for benefits on these grounds is
exceptionally high by comparison with other European countries. In
1989, legislation was introduced to improve workplaces and to reduce
sick leave, disability risks, work stress and other work-related problems.
This legislation was not successful, for the country faced substantial costs
for the care and rehabilitation of workers suffering from stress, muscu-
loskeletal disorders and other physical disabilities. The law failed both
because of the complexity of its enforcement and monitoring, and of
organizational weaknesses in preventing work risks and reintegrating
employees. The responsibility for improving working conditions was
therefore delegated to the social partners, with the government retaining
the role of initiation and facilitation. Here covenants proved instrumen-
tal, for they offered a new procedure to bring the interested parties
together.
Covenants on working conditions are agreements (51 of which were
reached between 1999 and the beginning of 2004) between the Ministry
for Employment and Social Affairs and the social partners, setting quan-
tifiable targets (Peters, 2001: 14) and designed to help employers and
workers to improve working conditions. Individual companies, especi-
ally small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), simply lack the scale
and scope to organize a thorough working-conditions policy, but can
learn from one another and from the other parties gathered under the
covenant. All covenants feature agreements on early reintegration into
the company after sick leave, and on reduction of stress, physical
workload and repetitive strain injuries. Such covenants now cover 46
percent of the Dutch working population (3.3 million workers), and
about half of them have been incorporated in sectoral collective agree-
ments.
A recent evaluation (Veerman et al., 2004) compared sectors with and
without a covenant on working conditions. Those without a covenant are
not inactive in the realm of working-conditions policies: they also have
European Journal of Industrial Relations 11(3)
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to reduce risks and costs. Sectors that have concluded covenants may well
be self-selected, with above average problems in this area. Organizations
that have pursued their own policies may indeed be in the vanguard; yet
we also find sectors where the degree of self-organization is too low to
permit any collective action, in the shape of covenants or otherwise. A
third remark is that differences between sectors with and without a
covenant cannot be exclusively explained by covenants alone. Neverthe-
less, there is a growing consensus as to the efficacy of the covenants.
The estimated yearly financial savings for employers are substantial
(Ministerie SZW, 2004: 28). The Ministry and the social partners made a
one-off investment of €275 million, not taking into account the costs of
companies in implementing the measures. The estimated yearly savings
(on costs for sickness leave and disability insurance benefits) are more
than €650 million. Total yield cannot be assessed yet, because of the
number of covenants still in the making.
For successful covenants, a number of elements are of importance: goal
consensus, specific and measurable goals, commitment and actual imple-
mentation at the level of the individual organization (Tweede Kamer der
Staten-Generaal, 1999: 16). We focus on a consensus concerning goals. It
is with respect to this that the major changes can be observed.
Where the market and prescriptive law both fail, two consequences
(not mutually exclusive) may result. The first consists in negative external
effects and the shifting of costs and risks from the microlevel of organiz-
ations to sectors or society at large; the second in the underutilization of
opportunities and capabilities not reached. Both may be tackled by
covenants: the first is exemplified by covenants on working conditions,
sickness absence and disability; the second by covenants on employment
and the labour market.
During the 1980s and 1990s, the Dutch government succeeded in
pushing back part of the financial burden of the social risks of inadequate
working conditions to the industry and organizational level (thus trans-
forming social into organizational risks). The expectation was that when
organizations had to foot the bill, they would change their behaviour. The
result at first was, not surprisingly, that working conditions became a
matter of cost comparisons. Where the law prescribed specific working
conditions, non-compliance might pay if the probable penalties were less
than the costs of improving conditions. But with a covenant, the shared
goal was a reduction of absence and disability, and the covenant brought
together the expertise for designing ways and means of making reduc-
tions feasible and manageable. Also, the covenant brought the interested
parties together by enlisting the cooperation of the organizations and
systems (‘stakeholders’) involved.
However, working conditions are only one of the causes of absence
from work. Consequently, the scope of the covenant widened, to include,
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for example, the effects of dead-end jobs, of limited opportunities for
occupational mobility and more generally, of limited employability. Here
again, the goal (improving employability) is a shared one, and again the
problem is to design the ways and means of getting there. A few
covenants to this effect are now in progress.
One final caveat: covenants are no substitute for self-regulation.
Although the problems tackled are of general interest, the parties actually
participating must have passed some threshold of self-organization. Only
those parties who have ‘in effect declared their strategic intentions but
not so far as to have assured their own success’ fall within the ambit of
the public effort ‘of convening and moderating groups of firms [and other
parties] that want to cooperate’ (Sabel, 1995: 14–16). The scale of the
covenant is therefore limited and such is recognized also in Dutch
practice: covenants have only flourished in sectors that possess self-
organization (Korver, 2002). Scale, by this token, does not signal the
urgency of the problems, but the readiness of the partners to tackle them.
If, however, the problem is such that the government feels (or is pres-
sured to feel) that the public interest is at stake (for example, the viabil-
ity of the welfare state, the boosting of participation and preparation for
the knowledge economy) it may indeed move into action to convene a
covenant.
Covenants and the Labour Market
We distinguish two types of labour market covenant. The first concerns
the employment opportunities for categories with a weak labour market
situation; the second, the employment situation in specific sectors.
As an example of the former, in May 2002 a covenant was concluded
for women re-entering the labour market. Though it is still in process,
the initial results are disappointing: despite a target of 50,000 jobs by
2005, only 2900 have been created. The low growth rate of the economy,
and in consequence increased unemployment, are blamed for this.
Another covenant, signed by the Ministry of Social Affairs and
Employment, the organization of SMEs (MKB Nederland) and the
central organization of the Dutch Public Employment Service (PES),
addressed the position of ethnic minorities in the labour market. It
commenced in early 2000 and lasted until the end of 2002 (before the
economic slowdown). The target was to create more than 60,000 jobs
over the three years, half of which were to involve employment of a
duration of at least six months. These targets were indeed achieved. At
the start of the covenant period, the SMEs had 180,000 vacancies and had
to compete in a then very tight labour market. The covenant was
therefore welcome, especially since it promised to tap relatively unused
European Journal of Industrial Relations 11(3)
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reservoirs of labour. Next to satisfaction over the results, the three parties
voiced their satisfaction with this form of mutual cooperation.
A further covenant, directed at the employment of ethnic minorities in
large companies and again concluded with the Ministry, started in 2002
and continued through 2004. It had no specific targets, but created an
enhanced sense of urgency within the companies involved, and improved
collaboration between companies and other parties in the labour market,
such as the PES. This covenant is first and foremost a learning experience
and its criteria of success are the creation of new networks in which ‘best
practices’ spread the initiative, improved procedures to reduce unnecess-
ary bureaucracy and harmonizing labour market opportunities with
social security constraints (Ministerie SZW, 2003).
We now turn to covenants in sectors with specific labour market
problems. The Dutch Ministry of Education, Culture and the Sciences
and the Sector Administration for the Educational Labour Market (SBO)
concluded a covenant in 2000 on the labour market situation in the
education sector; this was renewed at the end of 2002. Labour market
improvements were necessary, for employees constituted an ageing
workforce, sickness and absence rates were high, and the sector faced
considerable difficulties in recruiting new personnel and in retaining new
recruits.
The covenant had two targets: to identify the bottlenecks in the
educational labour market and to promote activities for their reduction.
Administratively, the covenant was complex: it both symbolized and
formalized the new separation between the SBO and the minister, who
until 2000 was a member of its board. Also, the SBO was dependent on
the social partners as these had to be involved in the identification of, and
the activities to reduce, the bottlenecks in the labour market. Moreover,
the covenant was a framework, to be subdivided into a number of
regional covenants. That is good policy, since labour markets have a
strong regional accent and most school boards are organized, if at all, on
a local or regional basis. Again, however, it exacerbates the administrative
complexity of the covenant as the number of projects, parties, goals and
targets also multiplied. The covenant is still in the process of execution,
but its renewal shows that for the many parties concerned the balance so
far has been more positive than negative.
Two covenants were concluded in the care sector, one for health care
proper (1998) and the other for youth welfare (1999). The convening
partners were the Ministry of Public Health, Welfare and Sports, the
social partners and the PES. The main goal of the two covenants was a
reduction in the shortage of personnel, by enlarging the inflow of trainees
and increasing the training effort for present personnel, reducing sickness
and disability absence and stimulating reintegration, by reducing
turnover and by the recruitment and selection of ethnic minorities. Here,
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too, the shortages were intensified by the general shortage of labour at
the time.
Overall, the targets have been met, without completely solving the
problem of the shortage of personnel. Again, the latter could very well
be the condition for the former, especially in a sector where the demand
for personnel today is matched by growing unemployment in the rest of
the labour market (OSA, 2003: 13–16). A side-effect of the covenants has
been better information on organizational and labour market trends,
strengthening the basis for policy. Some of the same administrative diffi-
culties that plague the education sector can be found here, with roughly
the same causes. Though the case for covenants looks good, its course has
not yet run.
The more successful labour market covenants were where labour
shortages could be overcome by tapping unused reservoirs of labour: as
in the care sector, in SMEs and, to a certain extent, in education. The
covenant for women re-entering the labour market fared less well. The
employment market for their services was actually shrinking and the
initiative soon lost momentum. Critical, then, is the joining of publicly
relevant goals (such as participation and employability) with the goals of
societal actors. The covenant offers a procedure for getting the parties
together and for initiating processes of mutual information, learning and
communication, in the sense of identifying bottlenecks and designing
ways and means to overcome them. At the same time, the actual processes
of joining forces show considerable complexity. Goals, bottlenecks,
procedures, processes and outcomes are related, distinct and also inextric-
ably intertwined, and this may hamper the development of cooperative
efforts precisely when they are most needed.
New forms of cooperation are always accompanied by risks. One
aspect of learning by monitoring is that the actors recognize their
involvement in ‘the kind of high-risk situation where public action can
matter most’ (Sabel, 1995: 14). Covenants meet that criterion: the govern-
ment has stakes in participation and employability, and in the quality of
care and education. The social actors had stakes as well, for which they
needed adequate forms of cooperation. All parties believed in the promise
of the covenant since it mapped and institutionalized support for a
common endeavour which could not otherwise have come about.
On a more general plane, covenants imply specific roles for both state
and civil society. Succinctly put, the ‘state should encourage or require
civil society actors to supervise themselves in the provision of services
and rules, and limit its own intervention to monitoring the self-super-
vision of civil society actors’ (Sabel, 2004: 173). This, to be sure, is a
programme for soft law, for accountable social and political actors and
for processes of learning where those who learn supervise themselves.
The latter is ‘learning by monitoring’.
European Journal of Industrial Relations 11(3)
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Learning, related to employment and employability, means acquiring
the knowledge to make and do the things that (labour) markets value (and
thereby unlearning the things not so valued). Monitoring means the
assessment by the partners in learning of whether the gains from learning
are distributed acceptably. Yet learning may lead to outcomes that favour
some parties more than others, and the very possibility of this may
hamper the effort of learning itself. The dilemma is that learning puts
existing relations of distribution at risk, that it ‘undermines the stability
of relations normally required for monitoring’ (Sabel, 1994: 231).
Coupling learning and monitoring can thus lead to blockages. Learning
produces winners and losers. On a micro-scale, new processes will lead
to an upgrading of some positions and a downgrading of others. Never-
theless, to guarantee the progress of learning, one may have to enlist the
endeavours of both prospective winners and eventual losers. Also, it is
likely that we do not know beforehand where gains are going to accrue
and losses be incurred. On a macro-scale, the present prediction is that
the advancing knowledge economy will exacerbate the inequality of
incomes. If uncorrected, this development might end in jeopardizing the
attempt to enhance rates of participation and employability.
Learning by monitoring attempts to evade such blockages. It does not
sever the relations between learning and monitoring; rather, it strength-
ens them. In so doing, it puts the idea of accountable self-regulation to
the test. The concept as such is an elaboration of several insights of
Hirschman’s studies on the economics and politics of economic develop-
ment, where the idea of sequence assumes centre stage. Instead of a
master plan pre-empting all further decisions, the emphasis is on induced
decision-making, in which one action leads to the next problem (or
‘bottleneck’), where learning by doing is prominent and is continuously
fed back into the decisions and planning of new moves and actions.
Instead of given resources and optimal allocation, induced decision-
making focuses on ‘calling forth and enlisting . . . resources that are
hidden, scattered, or badly utilized’ and on the process of combining
them. Tapping such resources depends on the presence or construction
of ‘pressure mechanisms’ or ‘pacing devices’ (Hirschman, 1958: 5, 25–6).
Resources are not the final constraint; nor is optimal allocation known
beforehand. What is optimal and which combinations work is a matter
of finding out in a process of ‘muddling through’ (Hirschman, 1971:
63–84). Instead of planning, we have exploring, and the need for an
adequate pacing device. Learning by monitoring is such a device, and the
covenant is the instrumental shape it can assume.
Korver & Oeij: The Soft Law of the Covenant
377
07_korver_057216 (jk-t)  29/9/05  2:44 pm  Page 377
Covenants and Transitions
Covenants are needed most to handle issues for which it is not yet clear
what exactly is required of the participants to achieve commonly set and
publicly valued goals and targets. Successful covenants reduce the risks
of projects which are necessary, but uncertain in terms of process,
outcome and the distribution of costs and benefits. If the subject tran-
scends the scope of collective bargaining (as with the integration of new
or non-participants in the labour market), the results of covenants can be
consolidated in PECs (Freyssinet and Seifert, 2001: 619). Even when the
subject matter of the covenant is within the scope of collective bargain-
ing, such bargaining is to no avail when the definition, the magnitude and
the distribution of risks are themselves unknown. Such situations require
governmental initiative or support to facilitate interaction between the
social actors. Collective bargaining may, of course, lead to socially and
publicly valued outcomes, but this is not its purpose. The public dimen-
sion is, however, one of the defining characteristics of a covenant, and if
need be, the ‘task of convening and moderating’ falls to the public auth-
orities ‘by default’ (Sabel, 1995: 16).
How do covenants relate to socio-economic transitions? In order to
secure the durable participation of men and women in the emerging
knowledge economy, new arrangements for combining work, care and
lifelong learning are needed. Also, the erstwhile separate spheres of
working, caring for one’s family and education need bridges for two-way
transitions between these spheres. According to Schmid (2002), such
transitions are the prime target for the reform of social security and the
labour market: the slogan is to make transitions pay rather than to make
work pay. The latter is still emphasized in the latest Draft Joint Employ-
ment Report; the former is conspicuously absent.
Instituting a system of transitional labour markets requires a radical
reorientation in the matter of risks. Risks can be of two kinds. Many
traditional labour risks involve danger: involuntary unemployment,
work accidents, ill-health and disability. Though coverage for these risks
is essential, they are not the risks we emphasize in the present context:
our focus is not on risks which are largely involuntary, but on those
which are to a greater extent chosen. What were once dangers may have
become, and may be helped to become, risks that can be managed. In the
context of transitional labour markets, one needs to discuss risks that we
choose to take, for instance when moving from one job to the next, from
one employer to the next, from one combination of activities in work,
care and education to the next and so forth. Here the issue involved in
risk is not danger, but trust. Not only do we need to insure against acci-
dents, ill-health, unavoidable old age or other contingencies, we want
assurance in moves we choose to make during our career and, indeed, in
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our chosen life-course trajectories. And as we make such moves in the
expectation that they conform to the general goals of more mobility,
more transitions and more training, we want to be able to cash in on our
insurance when these expectations are disappointed (Luhmann, 1988).
The opportunities for covenants in the framework of transitional labour
markets are in the transformation of risks: from danger to trust.
Trust is a two-way process. One needs to trust one’s partner and the
partner has to trust us. In bargaining, trust may be obtained by binding
oneself: it is a device for coping with the freedom of others, and for others
to cope with our own freedom. If our partner believes our ‘credible
commitment’, then she or he may accept reciprocal commitments. Repu-
tation (and the damage it may suffer) is an assurance for commitments.
While a contractual commitment is also possible, private contracts have
the disadvantage that keeping them depends on a cost/benefit calculation.
In other words, in order for contracts to be trusted, they depend in their
turn on other kinds of commitment (collateral, a confession or a promise)
(Frank, 1988; Schelling, 1963: 22–8). In that respect, covenants may
perform better. On the other hand and for the very same reason, it will
prove harder to muster the commitment of parties to enter into such
contracts.
We lack an adequate theory of the genesis of trust (Elster and Moene,
1989: 4–5; Gambetta, 1988: 231). In the learning-by-monitoring example,
trust is sort of a ‘by-product’ of cooperating, but how is it generated?
Under what conditions do we need trust in order to achieve and maintain
cooperation? Trusting someone means ‘believing that when offered the
chance he or she is not likely to behave in a way that is damaging to us,
and trust will be typically relevant when at least one party is free to dis-
appoint the other, free enough to avoid a risky relationship, and constrained
enough to consider that relationship an attractive option’ (Gambetta, 1988:
219). That is, trust presupposes exit (avoiding a risky relationship is viable
only if functional equivalents for that relationship are available), and it
requires for its growth and maintenance both voice (demanding safeguards
(monitoring devices, for example) against disappointment, otherwise the
relationship will not be upheld) and loyalty (combining attractions and
constraints). Exit requires competing possibilities; voice requires modes of
communication; and loyalty requires binding oneself.
Trust is like knowledge: it grows when used, and depletes when
unused. The covenants on working conditions match the requirements of
trusting cooperation. The agreements are not legally binding, the voice
of the parties concerned is enlisted, and the performance standards and
supporting timetables are included. However, there has been no similar
advance in the case of covenants on labour market issues, at least those
for weak categories in the labour market. Again, the agreements are not
legally binding, but the commitment of the parties enlisted is much more
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restricted. Nevertheless, in one evaluation of the covenant on improving
the opportunities for ethnic minorities, gains are reported in improved
relationships between the government and the participating companies,
in improved cooperation between the enlisted parties, in organizations
learning from one another and in the emergence of networks of organiz-
ations (Ministerie SZW, 2003). The improved record in cooperation may
in time produce enough trust for stronger performance standards and the
enlistment of more partners, needed to effect the performance goals.
However, our case concerning the build-up of transitional labour
markets is more complex than the examples given so far. The goals,
enhancing the possibilities for durable participation and improving
employability, are widely shared. Yet before these can be made opera-
tional, clarity as to the accountability of governments and social partners
is required. In our view, the government should take the lead; subse-
quently, the other questions (what cooperation is needed, with what
partners, in which timeframe, and towards what targets) can be
approached. Learning by monitoring, and developing accurate and
acceptable standards along the way, is the only way to proceed here: in
particular, if as we have hypothesized, the development of standards will
also produce the trust needed to continue cooperating. We emphasize at
this point that cooperation does not and should not exclude competition.
The possibility of not joining is important for covenants to work, as is
the possibility of opting out after joining. Competition is its own method
of learning and monitoring and it may contribute to better performance.
Concluding Remarks
The grand design for soft law is in combining ‘covenant and common-
wealth’, as Selznick puts it. Covenants are ‘prepolitical, foundational, and
consensual’, while a commonwealth is ‘a going concern that must balance
interests and harmonize functions’ (Selznick, 1992: 477–8). The task of
governments is indeed to balance interests and harmonize functions, and
to do so in a lawful and democratic manner. To fulfil this task, govern-
ments rely, and today must rely more and more, on the self-regulating
capacity of civil society. The covenant depends on a commonwealth, the
commonwealth on the covenant. The commonwealth presupposes effec-
tive government, the covenant presupposes and expresses the promise of
effective governance.
Covenants, thus, are all about the relation between state and civil society.
In that respect, they resemble the regulation of industrial relations, though
industrial relations pertain to collective interests, as distinct from public
interests.3 Indeed, covenants are a mechanism for bridging the public and
the collective spheres of interest. As such, they are highly demanding, on
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the quality of government and on the quality of civil society. Covenants
are not all-purpose tools: they are specific and even ‘dedicated’ investments
of viable states and civil societies, and their actual application can be
fraught with difficulties. Much more knowledge is needed of the factors
critical for success in order to make the most of the instrument and to test
its scale and scope. As it stands, we feel confident that in the Dutch context
the covenant has been useful and should be pursued, in particular in
developing the potential of transitional labour markets (Korver and Oeij,
2004a). In the broader European context, the reality of both common-
wealth and covenant seems, to date, a bridge too far. On the other hand,
furthering the interests of the OMC might very well profit from a better
insight into the conditions and results of the covenant and of its many
functional equivalents in regulating self-regulation.
NOTES
1 For a case study at the EU level, where employability policy is hampered by
the absence of credible and accountable government, see Korver and Oeij
(2004b).
2 This expression (literally, ‘informal administrative action’) is difficult to
translate meaningfully. For, ‘informales’ does not mean ‘informal’ in its
English sense: it denotes the implementation of public policy through non-
or extra-juridical mechanisms, which can take a multitude of forms. The key
feature is that government prepares the basis for implementing policies of
common concern (environmental to employment policies) in close
cooperation with those directly involved.
3 By ‘collective interests’ we denote those specific to particular groups and
organizations as against those that are general and societal.
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